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Regional Challenges

Diverging Interests: US Strategy
in the Middle East
Christopher J. Bolan, Jerad I. Harper,
and Joel R. Hillison
ABSTRACT: The novel coronavirus is only the latest in a series of
global crises with implications for the regional order in the Middle
East. These changes and the diverging interests of actors in the
region have implications for US strategy and provide an opportunity
to rethink key US relationships there.

M

ajor global crises, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, can result in a
significant reordering of the global and regional orders. The
ongoing coronavirus pandemic has the potential to accelerate a trend
already well underway in the Middle East: the emergence of a new and
dynamic regional order making the attainment of US interests more
challenging. This latest crisis provides an opportunity for policy makers
to reassess US strategy in the Middle East. For decades the region has
been a focal point for American foreign policy and the object of multiple
US and allied military campaigns.
Securing American national security interests in this troubled
environment will require US policy makers to be flexible, creative, agile,
and adaptive in managing rapidly evolving and transient relationships
among actors in the region. This article briefly examines how the actions
of key regional powers—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel—diverge
from US interests in the region and offers recommendations for how US
policy should adapt to these shifting realities.

Key US Interests

The 2017 National Security Strateg y describes the US vision of “a
Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist
terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and
that contributes to a stable global energy market.”1 Realizing this goal
requires promoting enduring US regional interests such as preventing the
emergence of a regional hegemon, promoting regional stability, ensuring
global access to the region’s energy resources, guaranteeing the survival
An earlier and abridged version of this article was originally published as Christopher J. Bolan,
Joel R. Hillison, and Jerad I. Harper, “Shifting Poles in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Regional
Strategy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (website), November 11, 2019, https://www.fpri.org
/article/2019/11/shifting-poles-in-the-middle-east-implications-for-u-s-regional-strategy/.
Revised and reprinted by permission of the authors and the publisher.
1. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, December 2017), 48.
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of Israel, limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
containing terrorism. The actions of emerging major regional powers,
namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, will strongly influence the
ability of the United States to promote these interests.

Iran
Tehran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy has been aimed at
countering and reducing the influence of the United States and its close
regional allies. US policy since the revolution has been to isolate and
contain Iranian influence. Accordingly, the United States has subjected
Tehran to a network of American and international sanctions designed to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons’ technology, limit its ballistic
missile program, and constrain its support of terrorist organizations.
Since the United States ended its compliance with the 2015 Iran
nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action—it has imposed a steadily intensifying campaign of economic
sanctions dedicated to compelling changes in Iran’s behavior. While this
policy of intensified sanctions has clearly imposed significant damage on
Iran’s economy, Iran’s malign influence continues in the region.
In response, Iran has taken steps to reduce its compliance with the
nuclear accord, expand its civilian nuclear activities, and shorten the
so-called breakout time required to produce a nuclear weapon.2 More
recently, Iran temporarily denied the International Atomic Energy
Agency access to some sites with suspected ties to a nuclear weapons
program.3 These steps, while reversible, are especially worrisome as
some hard-line Iranian leaders are signaling a willingness to withdraw
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Similarly, Iran’s missile programs also continue to advance despite
intensified and expanded American sanctions. In April 2020 Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps successfully launched its first satellite
into orbit—a step the United States strongly criticized as a cover for
Iran’s further development of a ballistic missile program designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons in the future.4
Iran is also actively seeking to undermine regional stability through
a network of Shia militia groups trained, equipped, and sponsored under
the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This network
includes a close relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah—a group the US
government formally designated a foreign terrorist organization in 1997.
In addition to arming Hezbollah with rockets and missiles capable of
2. Greg Priddy, “Concerns about Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time Are Set to Grow,” Stratfor,
February 21, 2020, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/concerns-about-irans-falling-nuclear
-breakout-time-are-set-grow-jcpoa-iaea-united-states-centrifuges.
3. Lara Jakes, “Iran to Allow U.N. Inspections of Previously Blocked Nuclear Sites,” New York
Times, August 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/world/middleeast/trump-iran
-nuclear-iaea.html.
4. Sandra Erwin, “Pompeo Blasts Iran’s Space Program in Wake of Satellite Launch,”
Space News, April 26, 2020, https://spacenews.com/pompeo-blasts-irans-space-program-in-wake
-of-military-satellite-launch/.
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threatening Israeli population centers, Iran provides critical financial
and military support to the Houthis militants in Yemen, enabling
the group to launch missile and drone attacks on Saudi civilian and
military facilities.5
In Iraq, Iran has deep and enduring ties with numerous Shia militia
groups. While playing a supporting role in liberating Iraqi territories from
ISIS control, these groups have also continued to launch direct attacks
on US and Iraqi facilities alike.6 Meanwhile in Syria, Iran continues to
recruit local fighters and Shia militia groups to bolster its only regional
ally in Damascus.7 There is little sign Iran will abandon its historical
support for these groups despite economic strains.8
Additionally leaders in Tehran have demonstrated the ability to attack
directly US and allied energy interests in the region. In September 2019
Iran conducted missile and drone strikes on refining facilities in Saudi
Arabia that temporarily cut Saudi oil production in half and reduced
global supplies by 5 percent.9 While Saudi Arabia quickly restored this
capability, these incidences highlighted the vulnerability of the Arab
Gulf state to Iranian attacks and clearly demonstrated the limits of any
US security guarantee.
As a direct consequence, Arab leaders have begun to hedge their
support for an American strategy of maximum pressure on Iran by directly
reaching out to Tehran to ease tensions. In early August 2019 the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) sent a military delegation to Tehran to discuss
coordinating security efforts to protect shipping in the Gulf and more
recently sent an airplane full of medical supplies to Iran in a gesture
of solidarity to help combat the coronavirus.10 Similarly, leaders in

5. Corey Dickstein, “CENTCOM: Weapons Shipment from Iran Seized in Arabian Sea Was
on the Way to Houthi Rebels in Yemen,” Stars and Stripes, February 19, 2020, https://www.stripes
.com/news/middle-east/centcom-weapons-shipment-from-iran-seized-in-arabian-sea-was-on-the
-way-to-houthi-rebels-in-yemen-1.619374.
6. Louisa Loveluck and Missy Ryan, “Militia Attacks on Americans in Iraq Are Becoming More
Audacious,” Washington Post, March 28, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle
_east/militia-attacks-on-americans-in-iraq-becoming-more-audacious-us-wrestling-with-how-to
-respond/2020/03/27/7b31d76c-6d38-11ea-a156-0048b62cdb51_story.html.
7. Golnaz Esfandiari, “Analysts See Little Change in Iran’s Strategy in Syria despite Reports
of Withdrawal,” Radio Free Europe, May 15, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tactical-change-or
-withdrawal-iran-s-syria-strategy-analyzed-amid-reports-of-force-reductions/30614695.html.
8. Raz Zimmt, “Iran’s Regional Ambitions Are Not Going Anywhere,” Atlantic Council
(blog), April 10, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-regional-ambitions
-are-not-going-anywhere/.
9. Humeyra Pamuk, “Exclusive: U.S. Probe of Saudi Oil Attack Shows It Came from
North – Report,” Reuters, December 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco
-attacks-iran-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-probe-of-saudi-oil-attack-shows-it-came-from-north-report
-idUSKBN1YN299.
10. “Rivals Iran and UAE to Hold Maritime Security Talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/mideast-iran-emirates/rivals-iran-and-uae-to-hold-maritime-security
-talks-idUSL8N24V3BO; and “UAE Sends Medical Aid to Iran as Coronavirus Outbreak
Intensifies,” Al-Monitor, March 17, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03
/uae-iran-medical-aid-coronavirus-outbreak.html.
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Riyadh have launched a quiet campaign of diplomatic outreach to Tehran
in order to avoid direct conflict.11
Moreover, US allies in Europe and in some Arab capitals have
sought some level of accommodation with Iran. Leaders in Germany,
Britain, and France are actively seeking to preserve the Iran nuclear deal
by creating alternative means of facilitating both international business
investments and the provision of humanitarian goods to Iran.12

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has often directly contributed to US interests by
using its position as a major swing producer of oil to stabilize global
oil markets at critical junctures.13 But the so-called Shale Revolution
has transformed the global energy market, propelling the United States
into position as the world’s largest oil producer and effectively making
the United States and Saudi Arabia competitors for the global market
share.14 In fact, some analysts directly attribute recent Saudi efforts to
flood the oil market to a campaign designed to drive US shale companies
out of business.15
In addition to these newly emerging tensions, the Kingdom has a
mixed record in terms of battling Islamic extremism. Terrorism expert
William McCants has characterized the Saudis as “both the arsonists
and firefighters” in this battle.16 Saudi Arabia has undoubtedly used
its wealth to promote a puritan and reactionary Wahhabi version of
Islamic theology, which now fuels many of the violent Sunni jihadi
terrorist groups threatening Western interests around the globe.17 While
acknowledging this troubled past, terrorism expert Daniel Byman also
notes Riyadh has simultaneously proven itself to be “a vital partner in
the struggle to defeat the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and other groups.”18
Moreover, Saudi Arabia is now effectively being led by Mohammed
bin Salman, the King’s son, heir apparent, and at 35 years old stands
to rule the country for several decades. At home he is pushing a
11. Declan Walsh and Ben Hubbard, “With U.S. Help No Longer Assured, Saudis Try a New
Strategy: Talks,” New York Times, December 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26
/world/middleeast/saudi-iran-qatar-talks.html.
12. Leila Gharagozlou, “EU Implements New Iran Trade Mechanism,” CNBC, January 31,
2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/31/eu-implements-new-iran-trade-mechanism.html.
13. John Kemp, “Saudi Arabia Cannot Escape Destiny as Swing Producer,” Reuters,
February 1, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oil-kemp/saudi-arabia-cannot-escape
-destiny-as-swing-producer-kemp-idUSKBN15G4OO.
14. Candace Dunn and Tim Hess, “The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil
Producer,” Today in Energy, US Energy Information Agency, September 12, 2018, https://www
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053.
15. Enea Gjoza, “Saudi Arabia Is Starting a Reckless Oil War with Russia–but the
US Is Also a Target,” Business Insider, March 14, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com
/saudi-arabia-starting-oil-war-with-russia-us-also-targeted-2020-3.
16. Scott Shane, “Saudis and Extremism: ‘Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters’,” New York
Times, August 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia
-islam.html.
17. Farah Pandith, “Extremism Is Riyadh’s Top Export,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2019, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/24/farah-pandith-saudi-how-we-win-book/.
18. Daniel L. Byman, “Saudi Arabia and Terrorism Today,” Markaz (blog), Brookings Institution,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/29/saudi-arabia-and-terrorism-today/.
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forward-looking economic agenda aimed at diversifying the Kingdom’s
oil-based economy, boosting the private sector, and creating a more
favorable environment for foreign investment.19 The crown prince
has also said he wants to foster a more tolerant version of Islam that
is not susceptible to being hijacked by violent terrorist groups for their
own purposes.20
At the same time, however, bin Salman has shown no signs of
undertaking any serious domestic political reforms that would be more
inclusive or serve as a basis to weaken the strong ruling hand of the
Saud family. Moreover, his behavior overseas has been reckless and
costly. As defense minister he plunged Saudi Arabia into an ill-advised
quagmire in Yemen that has highlighted Riyadh’s military incompetence,
drained its fiscal coffers, and raised doubts about the wisdom of his
personal leadership.21
In addition, he led a regional campaign to isolate Qatar that has
fractured the unity of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council and created
opportunities for Iran to expand its political, commercial, and military
presence in the region—all of which work at cross-purposes with
existing American strategies to isolate Iran. A continuation of these
troubling behaviors could trigger potentially significant changes ahead
in this long-standing partnership.

Turkey
When Recep Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party came to
power in 2003, the United States had hoped the republic would become
an example of how Islam and democracy could coexist in a secular state.
Over time, Erdogan’s Islamic leanings and domestic repression have
increasingly tarnished the image of Turkey as a secular democracy. After
the failed 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan blamed his former ally, Fethullah
Gülen, and the United States for failing to extradite Gülen from his
compound in the Poconos. The Gülen issue, along with terrorism and
Turkish cooperation with Russia, have increased tensions between the
United States and Turkey.
The Syrian civil war has exacerbated the instability in Turkey, the
Middle East, and Europe. In 2017 Turkey established observation posts
in Idlib to monitor agreements with Moscow to de-escalate tensions.
Since then, Turkey has sent around 20,000 troops into the Idlib province
in addition to clearing Kurdish fighters from the border with Turkey.22
This action has not only resulted in clashes between the Turkish and
19. “Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 Is Too Big to Fail—or Succeed,” Stratfor, July 27, 2018, https://
worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabias-vision-2030-plan-too-big-fail-or-succeed.
20. Martin Chulov, “I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince,”
Guardian, October 24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return
-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince.
21. Yoel Guzansky and Ari Heistein, “Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen Has Been a
Disaster,” National Interest, March 25, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias
-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064.
22. Isabelle Khurshudyan and Sarah Dadouch, “Russia and Turkey Agree to Cease-Fire in
Syria’s Idlib Province,” Washington Post, March 5, 2020.
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Syrian armies, it has also increased the risk of conflict with Russian and
US forces in the region.
Further, the Syrian war has created a massive influx of some 3.6
million refugees and migrants that Turkey hosts today.23 The offensive
in the Idlib province has displaced another 1 million Syrians.24 While
the EU has at least partially compensated Turkey for this burden—over
€6 billion—Turkish citizens and Erdogan are losing their patience with
the refugees. To deal with the recent movement of Syrians, Erdogan has
threatened to move them through Turkey to Europe.25 The COVID-19
virus may exacerbate tensions caused by the refugees and displaced
persons, placing additional strains on Turkey.
Erdogan’s obsession with the (real but exaggerated) security threat
posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK—an organization
designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and many
European countries) has led him to intervene militarily on multiple
occasions into neighboring Syria and Iraq. These operations have strained
Turkey’s military, which is still reeling from the massive leadership purges
of senior and mid-level officers ordered by Erdogan in wake of the failed
2016 coup. These Turkish interventions into the sovereign affairs of
neighbors have at various times exacerbated tensions with leaders in
Baghdad, Damascus, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow alike.
Considering its concerns over the PKK, Turkey has increasingly
cooperated with Russia to pursue its interests in the region. In addition,
both the United States and NATO have pushed back strongly against
Turkey’s deal to purchase S400 missiles from Russia, resulting in Turkey’s
suspension from the F-35 fighter program.26
In addition, Erdogan’s open support for the Muslim Brotherhood
has placed him into open conflict with regional leaders in Riyadh, Tel
Aviv, and Cairo. Meanwhile, his decision to intervene in Libya has also
put Turkey at odds with Egypt, Russia, and the UAE.27 The recently
escalated Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could also increase tensions
between Russia and Turkey, although both sides are working to constrain
the fighting.28 Further, Turkish drilling and exploration operations off
the coast of Cyprus are causing tensions between Turkey and members
of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum which includes Cyprus, Egypt,

23. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Turkey Fact Sheet,” February 2020,
https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/03/UNHCR-Turkey-short-Fact
-Sheet-February2020f.pdf.
24. Khurshudyan and Dadouch, “Cease-Fire in Idlib.”
25. Paul Hockenos, “Europe’s Morality Is Dying at the Greek Border,” Foreign Policy, March 5,
2020.
26. Jarod Taylor, “U.S. Sanctions and Turkey’s Purchase of Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System,”
E-Notes, Foreign Policy, July 12, 2019.
27. Keith Johnson, “Newly Aggressive Turkey Forges Alliance with Libya,” Foreign Policy,
December 23, 2019.
28. Maria Tsvetkova and Olzhas Auyezov, “Analysis: Russia and Turkey Keep Powder Dry in
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Reuters, November 9, 2020.
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Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.29 Moreover,
Turkey has developed a working relationship with Iran through the
Astana peace process and by providing humanitarian and medical
assistance for Iran to combat the coronavirus pandemic. Turkish entities
such as Halkbank have also sought to evade US sanctions on Iran.30
Clearly, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in
trouble. Polling in 2019 indicates over 80 percent of the Turkish public
now views the United States as a threat rather than an ally.31 Congress
has taken a harsher approach to Turkey by supporting sanctions on
Turkish arms manufacturers and, symbolically, by formally recognizing
the Armenian genocide in 1915.32

Israel
The preservation of Israel has been a vital interest for the
United States from the Cold War onward. While US support has been
instrumental in aiding Israel, today a strong and confident Israel with a
muscular foreign and internal security policy presents its own challenges
to the US interest in regional stability. Israel’s long-running effort to
guard against the external threat once posed by its Arab neighbors has
been replaced by a forward defense strategy against the threat of Iran
and its nonstate actor Shia Arab proxies. Meanwhile Israel’s struggle to
maintain and expand control over the occupied territory of Palestine
continues to complicate its relationships with Arab states who otherwise
might be inclined to pursue a more formal and visible partnership.
Despite the negative stigma of its continued occupation of
Palestine, Israel shares many values and a democratic political system
with the United States. The country also benefits from strong and
active constituencies within America’s Jewish and Evangelical Christian
populations that make support for Israel a domestic and foreign policy
concern for American leaders.
Regional threats to Israel’s security have eased due to extensive
continued US military assistance. Both Egypt and Jordan, which
traditionally posed a sustained and significant conventional military
threat to Israel’s southern and eastern borders, today share Israeli
concerns about the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups and have
developed effective working security relationships with Israel. More
recently, US diplomacy and weapons sales have helped induce the UAE
and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel—making official what
had long been quietly expanding economic and security cooperation.
29. Nimrod Goren, “Gas Forum a Diplomatic Opportunity for Israel,” Jerusalem Post, February
8, 2020; and “Turkey, Cyprus and Gas Deposits: What You Need to Know,” Deutsche Welle, July
16, 2019.
30. Brendan Pierson, “U.S. Prosecutors Accuse Turkey’s Halkbank of Scheme to Evade Iran
Sanctions,” Reuters, October 16, 2019.
31. Ragip Soylu, “Anti-US Sentiment in Turkey Reaches a New High, Poll Shows,” Middle East
Eye, February 1, 2019.
32. Philip H. Gordon and Amanda Sloat, “The Dangerous Unraveling of the U.S.-Turkish
Alliance: Washington and Ankara Still Need Each Other,” Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2020.
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Oman may soon follow and even Saudi Arabia’s crown prince reportedly
favors eventual recognition.33
To Israel’s north, Syria and Lebanon are now confronting serious
political, economic, and social divisions. Such divisions are consuming
the attention of leaders in Damascus and Beirut and will prevent these
states from presenting a serious conventional military threat for years
to come. America’s 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein and Baghdad’s
current domestic political turmoil and more immediate ISIS threat
effectively eliminate Iraq as a meaningful threat to Israel’s security.
These developments leave Iran and its proxies in Syria and Lebanon as
the most serious regional threat to Israel’s security.
In a dramatic change from the previous seven decades of its
existence, Israel today benefits from the parallel security concerns
of other Arab states, similarly focused on the threat posed by Iran’s
growing influence. Although public opinion in the Arab Street remains
anti-Israel, many regional Arab governments have quietly formed
increasingly strong security ties with Israel based on their own pragmatic
needs.34 These quiet partnerships complement US national security
interests. Nonetheless, while this behind-the-scenes coordination
and the expanding official recognition of Israel are important steps,
continued Israeli occupation and the absence of a formal peace
agreement with the Palestinians will act as constraints on Israeli hopes
of becoming a fully integrated and accepted member of any emerging,
region-wide political, economic, or security architecture. Additionally,
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans to annex formally much of
the West Bank, although temporarily suspended, continue to produce
friction with Jordan and other US Gulf allies.
Israel’s concerns about the growing threat from Iran have led it to
take increasingly aggressive active unilateral military and diplomatic
measures. Militarily, Israel continues periodic, but extensive air strikes
throughout Syria against Iranian or Iranian-backed targets and has
demonstrated its willingness to risk inflammatory and potentially
escalatory aftereffects.35 One strike in 2018 even led to Syrian air defenses
shooting down a Russian jet in the ensuing confusion.36 More recently,
Israel has expanded its reach into Iraq, including a series of summer
2019 drone strikes against Iranian proxies in Iraq that raised a potential
threat to the fragile US-Iraqi relationship and could have placed US

33. Mark Landler, “Another Gulf State Recognizes Israel. Here’s Why It Matters,” New York
Times, September 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/world/middleeast/bahrain
-israel.html.
34. Omar H. Rahman, “Order from Chaos: What’s Behind the Relationship between Israel and
Arab Gulf States?” Brookings Institution, January 28, 2019.
35. Judah Ari Gross, “‘Operation House of Cards,’ the IAF Mission to Cripple
Iran’s Presence in Syria,” Times of Israel, May 10, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com
/operation-house-of-cards-the-iaf-mission-to-destroy-irans-presence-in-syria/.
36. “Report: Syria Mistakenly Downs Russian Plane While Repelling Israeli Strike,”
Times of Israel, September 18, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-syria-mistakenly
-downs-russian-plane-as-it-repels-alleged-israeli-strike/.
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military forces in Iraq at risk from Iranian retaliation.37 While these
preemptive actions are understandable from the standpoint of an Israeli
state assessing itself vulnerable and increasingly surrounded by threats,
they complicate America’s efforts to counter Iranian and extremist
influence throughout the region.

Implications for US Policy

In a region increasingly under stress, the United States will need
to adopt policies that advance US interests in an increasingly complex
and constantly evolving security environment. Given the tremendous
uncertainties surrounding the region’s future, US policy makers should
adopt a hedging approach: pursue adaptive and flexible strategies toward
these states, based on the specific interests concerned; build diverse
coalitions-of-the-willing to confront challenges as they emerge; and
avoid large, one-sided investments in any single static group of countries
or partners.
As a part of this hedging approach, bilateral relationships with these
four countries will need to change. First, the United States should take
a more nuanced and expansive approach to Iran. Iranian influence in
the region should be resisted to the extent it harms US interests, but
US policy makers should also seek constructive engagement where interests
overlap. With a population of over 80 million people and significant
reserves of oil and natural gas, Iran and its regional influence cannot
simply be eliminated but instead must be actively opposed when
necessary and channeled in positive directions where possible.
The steps Iran has taken to reconstitute components of its civilian
nuclear program in the wake of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal
must be at the top of US security concerns. Thus far these steps are
reversible; Iran’s foreign minister has repeatedly stated Iran will return
to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action once
sanctions are lifted in accordance with the terms of the original deal.38
Should policy makers decide to return to negotiations with Iran,
the window for a potential agreement will be short due to upcoming
Iranian presidential elections scheduled for early 2021. Hardliner and
conservative candidates swept Iran’s parliamentary elections held
in February 2020 suggesting diplomatic proposals to make open
concessions to the United States will meet strong resistance.39 Taking
advantage of this fleeting opportunity will require urgent and creative
US diplomacy that incentivizes Iran’s return to the negotiating table and
lays out a credible plan for the phased easing of sanctions tied to specific

37. Katie Bo Williams, “Alleged Israeli Strikes Bring US to Crossroads in Iraq,” Defense
One, August 29, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/08/alleged-israeli-strikes
-bring-us-crossroads-iraq/159541/.
38. “Iran’s Fifth Step Away From the Nuclear Deal,” The Iran Primer (blog), United States
Institute of Peace (USIP), January 6, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/06
/iran%E2%80%99s-fifth-step-away-nuclear-deal.
39. Garrett Nada, “2020 Parliamentary Election Results,” The Iran Primer (blog), USIP, February
24, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/feb/24/2020-parliamentary-election-results.
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changes to Iranian activities in the region. Such diplomacy must generate
sufficient international support, reassure nervous US regional allies, and
refrain from generating opposition from Russia and China in the UN
Security Council.40
Additionally, Iran has the potential to play constructive or
destructive roles in addressing many of the region’s major security
challenges whether in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, or Afghanistan. US
policy makers will need to craft the right combination of pressures and
incentives to channel Iranian influence.
The current COVID-19 pandemic may present an opportunity for
US policy makers to reassert American leadership, build international
goodwill, and open a window for renewed negotiations with Iran.
Although the extent of the damage is unclear, Iran has been hit extremely
hard by the coronavirus at a time when its leaders were already under
intense domestic pressure. Extending an olive branch in the form of
humanitarian aid and temporary conditional lessening of sanctions
could offer a unique opportunity to demonstrate American support
for the Iranian people. Such a move could also de-escalate mounting
US-Iranian tensions.41
Similarly, future policy makers could initiate international, regional,
and bilateral discussions aimed at establishing the parameters for a more
enduring and effective Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action targeting the
full range of Iran’s problematic behavior. Such a diplomatic and economic
bridge-building exercise could start with small confidence-building
measures, including a targeted relaxation of sanctions and expansion
of foreign investments in Iran’s economy in exchange for parallel
restrictions on Iranian nuclear, missile, and other regional activities.
At the same time, the United States should seek to capitalize
on the convergence of Israel and Gulf Arab interests in contesting
Iran’s growing influence in the region by deepening and expanding
the recently concluded normalization agreements with the UAE and
Bahrain. Continuing the tradition of extensive US conventional military
assistance to and cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia provides a
strong foundation for deterring overt Iranian aggression. The United
States, nonetheless, should also be careful of relying too much on Israel
and Saudi Arabia as proxies to confront Iran. Ongoing Israeli air strikes
into both Syria and Iraq as well as the costly Saudi intervention into
Yemen demonstrate either of these partners are capable of instigating
larger regional conflicts into which the United States could easily
be drawn.

40. Daniel Benaim and Jake Sullivan, “America’s Opportunity in the Middle East: Diplomacy
Could Succeed Where Military Force Has Failed,” Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2020, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-05-22/americas-opportunity-middle-east.
41. Robert Malley and Ali Vaez, “The Coronavirus Crisis is a Diplomatic Opportunity for
the United States and Iran,” Foreign Policy, March 17, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/17
/coronavirus-crisis-maximum-pressure-iran-usa-diplomacy-opportunity/.
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US regional military strategy should rely heavily on a strong—if
necessarily transient—naval and air force presence to serve as a deterrent
to Iranian military adventurism that directly targets the United States
and its regional allies or endangers international shipping through the
Hormuz Strait. Meanwhile, the US Army presence in the region should
more narrowly focus on defeating ISIS and building partner capacity.
This reduced US physical military presence in places like Kuwait will
place primary responsibility for regional security in the hands of Arab
leaders while still providing a residual on-the-ground presence to
reassure allies.
Beyond military cooperation, US policy makers should also
explore potential measures to forge regional and international arms
control agreements that improve transparency and reduce the risks for
miscalculations that could spark regional military conflict. US policy
should expand both the substantive scope and roster of participants
in maritime patrol operations, which would ensure freedom of
navigation through critical choke points in both the Hormuz and
Bab el-Mandeb Straits.
A tailored US military presence should be simultaneously bolstered
by an increasingly active diplomatic and economic campaign aimed at
reducing prospects for a military confrontation with Iran; repairing the
internal Gulf Cooperation Council rift with Qatar; forging regional
solutions to the civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya; and addressing
the humanitarian needs of increasingly desperate refugee populations
fleeing these conflicts. The roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran
will be a key consideration in any of these efforts.
In some ways, Turkey may be the most difficult bilateral relationship
to navigate. The United States must make a concerted effort to address
Turkish fears emanating from an unstable southern border and the
continued threat from the PKK. The United States should also work
with its European allies to continue economic support for Turkey,
which has borne much of the brunt of caring for migrants and refugees
since 2015. The United States should continue bilateral and multilateral
exercises—under NATO—with Turkey, commit to retaining a nuclear
deterrent in Turkey, and roll back Congressional efforts to sanction
Turkey’s defense industry further.42
Turkey remains a force multiplier for US efforts to contain Russian
adventurism, to project power in the region, and to balance Iran’s
influence in the region. The United States should use its diplomatic,
economic, and military instruments of power to keep Turkey in the
NATO alliance, while working behind the scenes to curb Turkey’s
increasingly autocratic and expansionist tendencies.
At the same time, the United States needs to push back against
Erdogan courting Russia and Iran. In addition to suspending Turkey
from the F-35 program, US policy makers should consider limiting
42. Gordon and Sloat, “U.S.–Turkish Alliance.”
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other military sales to Turkey if Erdogan does not reverse course. The
United States must also continue to work closely with Erdogan regarding
Turkey’s presence in Syria and Iraq. The United States should explore
alternative basing arrangements so as not to be caught flat-footed in the
event Erdogan demands US forces depart Incirlik Air Base. The United
States should also seek to mediate competing resource claims between
Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus in the Aegean.43 Finally, the
United States should exert influence on Ankara to reinitiate peace talks
with the PKK that were suspended in 2015 and reduce military ties
with the YPG (the People’s Protection Units, a primarily Kurdish militia
in Syria and the major component of the Syrian Democratic Forces)
in Syria.44

Conclusion

The future of the Middle East is more in flux than it has been for
decades. The traditional poles of power emanating from Cairo, Baghdad,
and Damascus have been eclipsed by the rise of non-Arab powers
in Israel, Iran, and Turkey; competition from China and Russia; and
increasingly divergent interests between these regional powers, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States.
The COVID-19 pandemic has introduced even more uncertainty
into the region.45 Saudi Arabia, for instance, may well have sufficient
economic resources to emerge from this pandemic relatively unscathed;
however, other countries including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
and Yemen may suffer damage only large-scale international assistance
can hope to mitigate. In this situation, existing US policies and strategies
need to adapt quickly to these challenges as they emerge in the region.
Even competently led and well-resourced governments will have trouble
surmounting these challenges, and such governments are in rare supply
in the Middle East.
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